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ABOUT THE SERIES 
Drawing on the systematic 
methodologies behind investigative 
journalism, open source intelligence 
gathering, big-data, criminology, and 
political science, this series maps the 
transnational corporate, legal and 
governmental structures employed by 
organisations and figures in Central 
Asia to accumulate wealth, influence 
and political power. The findings will 
be analysed from a good governance, 
human rights, and democratic 
perspective, to draw out the big 
picture lessons. 
Each instalment will feature a digestible 
analytical snapshot centring on a 
particular thematic, individual, or 
organisation, delivered in a format that 
is designed to be accessible to the public, 
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The tenure of Uzbekistan’s President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has to date been marked 
by an ambitious reform agenda, typified by a commitment to creating a level and 
obstruction-free environment for business. This follows a turbulent period under 
President Islam Karimov (1991-2016) where a range of anti-competitive practices 
were used to support the business interests of senior regime figures, their family 
members, and clients. International organisations such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Labour Organization and the 
United Nations, have provided strong assurances that the reforms have succeeded 
in creating an optimal environment for business, that is sympathetic  
to entrepreneurship at home, and investment from abroad. 
This report presents an in-depth 
investigative case study focusing on 
businesses founded, or substantively 
tied to Komil Allamjonov, a major 
national figure in Uzbekistan who has 
played a number of prominent roles 
in business, government and civic life. 
The case study provides evidence of 
ongoing state-corporate practices that 
appear detrimental to a level playing 
field for business, where the rights of 
consumers and citizens are protected.
Komil Allamjonov is a critical player 
in the Mirziyoyev government’s 
reform effort. As the President of 
Uzbekistan’s press secretary during 
2017 and 2018, he had an influential role 
in an ambitious rebranding exercise 
undertaken by the government in 
order to rehabilitate Uzbekistan’s 
international image. In 2018 Allamjonov 
was then given responsibility for 
overseeing the development of a 
vibrant and strong fourth estate, 
as head of Uzbekistan’s Agency for 
Press and Information, which in 2019 
was reorganised as the Agency for 
Information and Mass Communications. 
Allamjonov stepped down from 
this post in January 2020. He has, 
nonetheless, continued this work as 
chairman of the Board of Trustees for 
the newly established civic body, the 
Public Foundation for Support and 
Development of National Mass Media. 
His deputy on the Board of Trustees 
is Saida Mirziyoyeva eldest daughter 
of the President of Uzbekistan. Prior 
to these high profile public and civic 
positions, Allamjonov served in a 
number of senior roles at the State Tax 
Committee from 2005 to 2013, while at 
the same time launching start-up tech 
and media companies focused on tax 
and accounting products.
Investigations into these businesses 
founded by Allamjonov reveal that they 
have been in receipt of considerable 
privileged treatment by the state, 
which is arguably anti-competitive 
in character. Evidence collected for 
this report indicates that the start-up 
companies Soliq Info (tax specialist 
newspaper), and BEM (accounting 
software) founded by Allamjonov, 
benefited when state tax inspectors 
coerced businesses into purchasing 
subscriptions. Allamjonov did not 
respond to repeated requests for 
comment. It cannot, therefore, 
be verified in this report whether 
Allamjonov, or any company managers 
were aware of, or condoned these 
coercive practices used by tax 
inspectors. Additionally, state sales 
and marketing support was provided 
to Soliq Info, BEM, and Ereport Service, 
through promotional joint-events, 
state testimonials, and privileged 
access to government officials/
infrastructure. In the case of Ereport 
Service, government agencies were 
tasked with securing ‘voluntary’ sales 
contracts with consumers on behalf 
of this tech start-up company founded 
by Allamjonov. The majority of this 
beneficial treatment took place during 
a period when Allamjonov served 
as a senior official with the State Tax 
Committee, although the latter state 
directive took place after Allamjonov 
left his government posting.
The evidence collected indicates that 
commercial advantages have also been 
given by the Mirziyoyev government 
to businesses either founded by 
Allamjonov, or which are tied to him 
in a substantive way. For example, a 
driver training business founded by 
Komil Allamjonov, Avtotest Report, 
was given a commercial monopoly by 
government decree over advanced 
driver training. This was subsequently 
removed following public outcry over 
what was widely viewed as anti-
competitive provisions. Later in 2020, 
Radio Ozodlik exposed a Cabinet of 
Ministers decree, which has not been 
released to the public through  the 
national legal database lex.uz. It 
awards to GID Systems Tashkent LLC, 
without tender, a highly beneficial 
project upgrading cadastral passports 
for real property in Uzbekistan using 
smartcard technology. In the decree, 
the investor is in effect indemnified 
against loss by the government of 
Uzbekistan. Evidence collected for this 
report indicates Komil Allamjonov  
has substantive ties to the GID group, 
which is owned by an opaque offshore 
holding entity incorporated in a UAE 
free economic zone. 
Komil Allamjonov initially agreed to 
provide a response to a set of questions 
submitted by the authors, on condition 
that a draft of the report was sent 
for his inspection. A draft copy of the 
report was provided to Allamjonov, 
along with questions relating to his 
business interests. Several follow up 
email and social media communications 
were made in an effort to secure 
comment. No subsequent response 
was received by Komil Allamjonov. 
A freedom of information request 
was submitted to the government 
of Uzbekistan. It related to some of 
the privileges awarded to businesses 
founded by Allamjonov. The State Tax 
Committee informed the authors that 
these records have been destroyed. 
This appears to be in violation of record 
retention requirements set out in the 
law On Archival Matters. The Ministry 
of Internal Affairs did not respond to 
a request for information.
As a result of this report’s findings, 
and other case studies presented in 
the Power Brief series, alongside third 
party publications, it is concluded that 
opaque, anti-competitive practices 
authored by the state in Uzbekistan, 
continue to inhibit the development 
of a level playing field for business. 
These practices it is argued will 
deter domestic entrepreneurship and 
foreign direct investment, while also 
impairing consumer and business 
rights. Tangible public policy steps are 
recommended, including a register 
of financial interests for government 
officials; a public corporate register 
inclusive of current and historical 
information pertaining to shareholders, 
directors, beneficial owners, persons 
with significant control, annual 
reports, audit reports and balance 
sheets; the ending of closed, anti-
competitive practices; the provision of 
state support on an open, transparent 
and competitive basis; effective 
enforcement of conflict of interest 
regulations; enhanced due diligence 
for senior public appointments; and 
further capacity building to ensure 
state compliance with freedom of 
information, and record retention laws.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PART I
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1 Lasslett, K., Kanji, F., and McGill, D. ‘“A dance with the cobra”: Confronting grand corruption in Uzbekistan’, International State Crime Initiative, 2017, available online: 
https://d1fz6q6taiufku.cloudfront.net/uploads/2020/04/Full-Report-with-Executive-Summary.pdf (accessed 24 July 2020); Lewis, D.G. ‘Tackling corruption in 
Uzbekistan: A white paper’, Open Society Eurasia Program, June 2016, available online: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/ff271daf-1f43-449d-
a6a2-d95031e1247a/tackling-corruption-uzbekistan-20160524.pdf (accessed 24 July 2020)
2 This issue will be documented in a future issue of the Power Briefs series.
3 Matyakubova, D. ‘Who is “Tashkent City” for? Nation-branding and public dialogue in Uzbekistan’, Central Asia Program Paper 205, June 2018, available online: 
https://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Matyakubova-CAP-Fellows-Paper-June-2018.pdf (accessed 18 August 2019)
4 Matyakubova, D. ‘The perils of rebuilding Uzbekistan: The rise of glass and glitter’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 14 July 2020, available online: https://fpc.org.uk/the-
perils-of-rebuilding-uzbekistan-the-rise-of-glass-and-glitter/ (accessed 15 July 2020) 
5 Astrup, J. Twitter Post. November 9, 2017. https://twitter.com/AstrupILO/status/928621566010757123; Igoe, M. and Fraser, H. ‘Q&A: Uzbekistan has “thirst for ideas, 
knowledge, technical expertise,” says UNDP official’, Devex, 16 May 2018, available online: https://www.devex.com/news/q-a-uzbekistan-has-thirst-for-ideas-
knowledge-technical-expertise-says-undp-official-92760 (accessed 15 July 2020); Rigterink, J. ‘Reforming Uzbekistan: challenges and opportunities’, German-Uzbek 
Business Forum, 14 January 2019, available online: https://www.ebrd.com/news/speeches/reforming-uzbekistan-challenges-and-opportunities.html (accessed 15 
July 2020);
During the late Karimov era (2005-2016), state organs in Uzbekistan were increasingly 
viewed as partial instruments used by senior regime figures to curate their own private 
interests, and the interests of family members and closely aligned business clients.1 
In order to obtain valuable political concessions (such as operating licenses, or the right 
to convert currency at official rates), and to avoid arbitrary harassment from regulatory 
authorities, historical records and investor testimonies, indicate political favour was 
essential. In the most extreme examples from this period, successful business people 
lacking political protection, were tortured, imprisoned and further extorted, with their 
businesses expropriated by corrupted courts, and handed over to regime figures or 
regime linked figures.2 This caused immeasurable harm to investor confidence and 
the government of Uzbekistan’s international reputation. 
This type of activity also impairs 
essential market signals and forces. 
In order for markets to operate 
effectively, it is critical that there is a 
level playing field where businesses 
are able to compete in a fair, open, and 
transparent manner. Where political 
power is employed in a partial manner 
to give particular businesses an 
advantage, for example through 
discounted access to capital, expedited 
approval of coveted licenses, special 
legal rights, or dispensation from certain 
social obligations such as taxation, it 
disrupts market mechanisms and forces 
that are critical to driving innovation, 
and growth. It also deters responsible 
foreign investors, who are unwilling to 
risk capital in an environment where the 
dice are seen to be loaded. 
In order to confront the significant 
stigma engendered by these past state 
practices, the government of President 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev has invested 
significant monetary and political 
capital in a rebranding exercise.3  
For this rebranding effort to succeed 
it is critical that it is more than just 
a technical process.4 It depends on 
the initiation of public and corporate 
governance structures that stimulate 
a level playing field in Uzbekistan 
that is transparent and human rights 
compliant, where businesses clearly 
succeed on the basis of their products, 
abilities and foresight, rather than 
preferential treatment from the state, 
and where consumer rights to freely 
choose from a diverse range of 
competitive service providers is assured. 
Public policy attention has primarily been 
focused on the technical elements of 
this exercise, such as policy change, 
legal reforms, and institutional 
restructuring designed to grow the 
private sector, open up capital markets, 
and remove barriers for business. 
Influential international institutions 
such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the 
International Labour Organization and 
the United Nations, have provided 
strong assurances to the private sector 
on the integrity of the playing field 
brought about by these technical 
reforms.5 While these advances deserve 
recognition, there nonetheless has 
been to date a lack of substantive 
evidence-based inquiry to determine 
whether the benefits of these 
liberalising measures are being skewed, 
as in the past, towards particular 
business groupings in receipt of 
preferential state treatment. 
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This UzInvestigations’ study into 
businesses founded by, or substantively 
connected to Komil Allamjonov - a critical 
figure in the Mirziyoyev government’s 
national rebranding exercise - indicates 
why caution is still required. In 2017 
Allamjonov was made Press Secretary 
to the President of Uzbekistan, and 
then Deputy Head of the Presidential 
Administration. He came into the post 
a young, successful tech and news 
entrepreneur, who in under a decade 
had established a number of companies 
dedicated to servicing the accounting 
and tax professions, while also 
assuming a number of senior roles at 
the State Tax Committee. Allamjonov 
branched out later into media founding 
national broadcaster, Milliy TV. 
In 2018, Allamjonov was appointed 
Director General of the Uzbekistan 
Agency for Press and Information, 
which was subsequently reorganised 
as the Agency for Information and 
Mass Communications. During 2019, 
the President of Uzbekistan’s eldest 
daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, was 
appointed Deputy Director at the 
Agency for Information and Mass 
Communications . Under the leadership 
of Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva the 
agency framed itself at home, and 
abroad, as an institution strongly 
committed to the growth of a resilient 
fourth estate in Uzbekistan, made up of 
both traditional and new media, where 
journalistic freedoms are protected. 
In January 2020, both Allamjonov 
and Mirziyoyeva left the Agency for 
Information and Mass Communications. 
Shortly after their departure it 
was announced that Allamjonov 
has been elected Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees for the newly 
established Public Fund for Support 
and Development of National Media. 
Mirziyoyeva, had been made Deputy 
Chairperson. The public fund frames 
itself as a grant-making, capacity 
building, and advocacy NGO working 
at arms-length from government, to 
further develop the fourth estate in 
Uzbekistan, through: the promotion 
of media freedom, transparency, and 
journalistic integrity; supporting a fair 
playing field in the media market; and, 
through supporting the work and rights 
of journalists and bloggers. Foreign 
Agents Registration Act filings in the 
United States indicate the public fund 
has significant capital reserves which 
it is using to promote the Mirziyoyev 
government’s human rights record 
abroad, with direct support from  
senior Uzbek government officials.  
While Allamjonov’s public and civic 
career has recently been typified by the 
promotion of transparency, freedom, 
integrity, and a fair market playing field, 
close examination of the businesses 
founded by Allamjonov, focusing on 
the period from 2008 to 2020, reveals 
evidence that they have benefited from 
preferential treatment provided by 
the state. 
For example, whilst serving as Head of 
Press Service (2005-2009), and then 
Head of Information Services (2009-
2013) at the State Tax Committee, 
Allamjonov founded a number of high 
profile businesses, including Soliq Info  
(a tax specialist newspaper), 
BEM accounting software, the Ereport 
tax platform and later the Avtotest 
driver training software.6 The case 
study presented in this report features 
evidence, presented in section III, 
which indicates that Soliq Info, BEM 
and Ereport all benefited from the 
provision of significant marketing and 
sales support from Allamjonov’s then 
employer the State Tax Committee, 
in addition to other government 
agencies. Compounding matters, 
serious allegations made by members 
of the accountancy profession are 
documented. They claim accountants 
and tax professionals were coerced by 
tax inspectors into purchasing Soliq 
Info and BEM subscriptions. While it 
cannot be inferred that Mr Allamjonov 
or his managers were aware of the 
state coercion being actioned for Soliq 
Info and BEM’s benefit, the evidence 
collected indicates that the latter 
businesses derived new revenue 
streams as a result of this abuse of 
state power. 
The formal role of the state expanded 
with Avtotest. A series of decrees were 
passed, granting the driver training 
business certain exclusive rights, 
and a guaranteed market. These 
decrees were signed by the current 
President and Prime Minister, the 
critical resolution is dated September 
2017. By this time Allamjonov had left 
his post at the State Tax Committee.  
However, in December 2017 Allamjonov 
was appointed Press Secretary to the 
President of Uzbekistan, prompting 
serious public concern over the 
exclusive deal given to Avtotest just 
a few months earlier. This matter is 
examined in part IV of the report.
6 ‘Uzbekistan forever: How to create a business without a start-up investment?’, Forbes, 20 June 2014, available online: https://webcache.googleusercontent.
com/search?q=cache:wM2L_y9s5zcJ:https://news.rambler.ru/world/25635230-uzbekistan-forever-kak-sozdat-biznes-bez-startovogo-kapitalovlozheniya/
amp/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk (accessed 15 August 2019).
Shortly after Allamjonov’s departure 
from the Agency for Information and 
Mass Communications in January 2020, 
to assume the Chairmanship at the Public 
Fund for Support and Development of 
National Media, a Cabinet of Ministers 
decree was issued for a major public 
project that will convert the paper 
based cadastral passport system for 
real property to plastic smartcards. 
The project was awarded to the company, 
GID Systems Tashkent, without tender. 
The related Cabinet of Ministers’ decree 
was not published on the government 
legal database, lex.uz. Radio Ozodlik 
was able to obtain a copy of the decree 
and put a public spotlight on its 
provisions. It was unable, however, 
to identify the beneficial owner(s) 
of GID Systems Tashkent. GID shares 
are held through an opaque offshore 
company incorporated in the UAE. 
This report in Part V provides new 
evidence which substantively ties 
Komil Allamjonov to the GID group 
of companies in Uzbekistan.  
As a result of these findings, alongside 
other documented cases, it is concluded 
in Part VI that evidence is emerging 
which suggests the benefits being 
generated by the Mirziyoyev 
government’s liberalisation agenda 
risks being skewed towards certain 
individuals and corporate actors, 
owing to preferential state treatment. 
Questions are also raised in the 
conclusion over whether a substantive 
programme of reforms can be led 
by regime figures who have founded 
businesses which appear to have 
systematically benefited from 
preferential treatment, and arguably, 
anti-competitive practices. The final 
section of this report considers the 
reform priorities these risks prompt.
Data for the report was collected by 
Professor Lasslett and the Uzbek Forum 
for Human Rights using a range of 
methods, including the collation and 
triangulation of company filings, 
meeting minutes, patent information, 
laws, and decrees, from government 
databases; the gathering of open 
source intelligence using advanced 
search techniques; the application 
of transaction and network mapping 
software to maximise the analytical 
yield from collated data; while a local 
investigative journalist conducted two 
formal interviews with accountants in 
order to further triangulate allegations 
uncovered in the documentary data, 
and obtain comment from industry 
professionals. 
On 28 August 2019, a series of questions 
based on the findings were sent to Komil 
Allamjonov for comment. Allamjonov 
agreed to provide comment once access 
to the draft report had been provided. 
The draft report was sent to Allamjonov 
on 24 September 2019. A follow up 
email was sent on 2 October 2019. 
Allamjonov did not respond to either 
email. Further questions were sent to 
Allamjonov relating to GID Systems 
Tashkent on 11 July 2020, through email 
and Facebook, mediums where Lasslett 
and Allamjonov previously communicated. 
No response was received. 
A freedom of information request 
was submitted to the government of 
Uzbekistan, for copies of several proposals 
cited in official documentation delivering 
benefits to businesses founded by 
Allamjonov. The government did not 
provide access to the requested 
information. According to the State  
Tax Committee the relevant records 
under their charge have been destroyed. 
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As a result of limited corporate 
transparency, it is difficult to scrutinise 
the financial position, ownership 
structure, or management, of entities 
incorporated in Uzbekistan. However, 
in the case of Komil Allamjonov he has 
made certain admissions on the public 
record to Forbes about his private 
business interests, which allows 
assumptions to be made beyond what 
is recorded in the national register of 
legal entities. In particular, he claims to 
be the founder of the companies Soliq 
Info, BEM Systems, Ereport Service, and 
Avtotest Report, in addition to the news 
portal Uz24.10 These businesses are 
widely attributed to Allamjonov in news 
reporting, an attribution that does not 
appear to have been publicly contested 
by Allamjonov or his office.11 Allamjonov 
is also reported to be the founder 
of Milliy TV, a national television 
broadcaster.12
When conducting investigations into business groups in 
Uzbekistan, substantive informational barriers can be 
encountered. While a growing share of economic activity 
in Uzbekistan is conducted through limited liability 
companies, only basic forms of corporate transparency 
are required.7 The state administers a public business 
register which contains company extracts for entities 
incorporated in Uzbekistan. It is a contemporaneous 
extract (i.e. there is no historical information), which lists 
the current shareholders and the name of an executive 
manager, alongside information on the company’s date 
of incorporation, registered addresses, phone number, 
email address, and statutory funds. No public record is 
available on share transfers, appointment of directors, 
annual reports, balance sheets, audit reports, and other 
key filings. Nor is there any requirement to publicly list 
beneficial owners, or persons with significant control over 
an incorporated entity, which is increasingly regarded 
internationally as an essential reporting measure for 
combatting money laundering, tax evasion, corruption  
and terrorism.8 The use of nominee shareholders,9 and 
opaque offshore holding structures, is common practice  
in Uzbekistan at elite levels, especially for politically 
exposed persons (PEPs) and high profile business people.
PART II
7 Law on Limited and Additional Liability Companies, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan,No.310-II, 6 December 2001, available online: https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4607985 
(accessed 12 August 2019)
8 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Best practices on beneficial ownership for legal persons’, October 2019, available online: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/Best-Practices-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020); Harari, M., Knobel, A., Meinzer, M., and Palansky, M. 'Ownership 
registration of different types of legal structures from an international comparative perspective. State of play of beneficial ownership - Update 2020’, Tax Justice 
Network, 1 June 2020, available online: https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/State-of-play-of-beneficial-ownership-Update-2020-Tax-
Justice-Network.pdf (accessed 15 July 2020)
9 Nominee shareholders legally possess the shares, but do so on behalf of a third party. These arrangements allows PEPs to avoid public exposure. 
10 ‘Uzbekistan forever: how to create a business without a start-up investment?’, Forbes, 20 June 2014, available online: https://web.archive.org/
web/20170202005843/https://news.rambler.ru/world/25635230-uzbekistan-forever-kak-sozdat-biznes-bez-startovogo-kapitalovlozheniya/ (accessed 15 
August 2019); ‘Avtotest: Viva la evolucion!’, The Voice of Tashkent, 19 September 2015, available online: vot.uz/article/2015/09/19/chitay-eto-golosom-dj-piligrima 
(accessed 16 August 2019)
11 ‘Press Secretary of the President appointed’, Gazeta, 4 December 2017, available online: https://www.gazeta.uz/oz/2017/12/04/prezident/ (accessed 4 September 
2019); ‘Komil Allamjonov appointed acting chief of press agency’, The Tashkent Times, 29 November 2018, available online: https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/3233-
komil-allamjonov-appointed-acting-chief-of-press-agency (accessed 4 September 2019)
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However, at the time this report was 
initially drafted in August 2019 
Allamjonov did not appear on the share 
register for any of the aforementioned 
concerns, as Table 1 demonstrates. 
Because a number of these firms are 
tech based businesses, subsequent 
checks were conducted using Uzbekistan’s 
Intellectual Property Agency patent 
register. Eighteen registered patents 
were located where Allamjonov is 
identified as the author. The results 
are included in Table 1.
A few other details are noteworthy in 
Table 1. 
First, Soliq Info Tahririyati shares are 
held by Yelena Allamjonova. Through 
this company she also part owns BEM 
Systems, with X Sultanova. A Wikipedia 
profile for Komil Allamjonov states  
that Elena Allamjonova is his spouse.16  
Mr Allamjonov did not respond to 
correspondence requesting confirmation 
of this fact. The Wikipedia profile for 
Komil Allamjonov was subsequently 
edited by a user Yuyuh on 30 July 2020, 
removing spousal information from 
Allamjonov’s profile.17 
The second issue of note, is that an 
individual by the name of Bobur 
Alimbabayev has a social media 
account on Facebook, where he lists 
his employer as Soliq Info.18 
Finally, Soliq Info, Ereport Service, 
and Avtotest are businesses which 
Allamjonov states to have founded. 
He did not appear on the share registers 
when checked on 16 August 2019. 
Nevertheless, Intellectual Property 
Agency filings attribute authorship 
of patented technology registered by 
these businesses to Komil Allamjonov.
Table 1: Businesses which Komil Allamjonov claims to have founded, company extract checked on 16 August 
2019,14 patents checked on 21 June 2020.15 
Company Date of Incorporation Shareholder(s) Patented Software Author
Soliq Info Tahririyati 9 September 2009 Allamjonova Yelena Kamalovna Allamjonov Komil Ismoilovich
Soliq Info Centre 5 August 2008 X Sultanova n/a
Ereport Service 21 August 2012 Sultanova Khurshida Ismailovna Allamjonov Komil Ismoilovich








Pomidor Entertainment 30 July 2014 Alimbabayev Bobir Baxodirovich
Diagram 1: A digraph of companies founded by Allamjonov based off corporate data collated in August 2019, supplemented by 
patent registry data.
13 Allamjonov is the author of software registered by a separate company, BEM Training Centre.
14 Soliq Info Tahririyati LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.003542-09, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 August 2019; Soliq Info Centre LLC, Company 
Extract, Reg No.2775-09, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 August 2019; Ereport Service LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.18563, Unified 
Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 August 2019; BEM Systems LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.3763-09, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, 
accessed 16 August 2019; Avtotest Report LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.005983-03, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 August 2019; Pomidor 
Entertainment LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.9191-04, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 16 August 2019.
15 See patent numbers 02649, 02723, 02798, 02799, 02800, 02801, 02802, 02803, 02806, 02857, 04488, 05253, 05228, 05236, 05237, 05229, 05376, and 05543, 
available online through the Intellectual Property Agency patent register, http://baza.ima.uz/
16 'Komil Allamjonov', Wikipedia, available online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komil_Allamjonov (accessed 14 August 2019)
17 See Wikipedia page edit data here https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Komil_Allamjonov&type=revision&diff=970278365&oldid=929482916
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In Allamjonov’s most recent public role 
as acting Director of the Agency for 
Information and Mass Communications 
his responsibilities included protecting 
rights to freedom of speech and 
information, protecting the rights 
of journalists, developing the mass 
media, opening up the civil service 
through transparency measures, 
promoting the government’s image 
abroad and counteracting ‘threats’ 
in the information sphere.20 In April 
2019 the President’s eldest daughter 
Saida Mirziyoyeva was made a deputy 
director in the Agency. 
Both Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva left 
the agency on 29 January 2020, and 
were elected Chairman and Deputy 
Chair, respectively, for the NGO, Public 
Fund for Support and Development 
of National Mass Media. Its Director 
is Alexandra Kolesnichenko, who 
previously served as departmental 
head at the Agency for Information 
and Mass Communications.21 The Public 
Fund’s mission is to ‘promote a level 
playing field in the media landscape and 
to defend the rights of media outlets 
and individual journalists and bloggers 
and provide comprehensive support for 
them’.22 Allamjonov claims the body will 
be funded through foreign grants and 
local philanthropists. He has assured 
the public that business people will not 
be forced to contribute.23
Documentation relating to the Public 
Fund’s foreign activities in the United 
States indicate it works in close 
collaboration with senior Uzbek state 
officials in an effort to support the 
Mirziyoyev government’s propaganda 
objectives abroad. For example, shortly 
after the appointment of Allamjonov 
and Mirziyoyeva in 2020, the Public 
Fund placed a Washington DC public 
relations firm, Bridgeway Advocacy LLC, 
on a US$30,000 per month retainer. 
According to Foreign Agents Registration 
Act filings, Bridgeway Advocacy ‘will 
seek to improve knowledge among U.S. 
policymakers and the U.S. private sector 
of the advancements being made’ 
in Uzbekistan with respect to ‘freedom 
of speech, press and journalist freedom, 
and gender equality’.24 The filings state 
Bridge Advocacy will organise ‘meetings 
and briefings with government officials 
and briefings with U.S. and international 
media outlets and visits to the U.S. by 
public and private sector officials from 
Uzbekistan’. As part of this contracted 
work, Bridgeway Advocacy notes that it 
will liaise with Republic of Uzbekistan 
embassy officials in the U.S., and the 
Director of Uzbekistan’s Capital Markets 
Development Agency. Filed lobbying 
materials applaud the Mirziyoyev 
government’s record on human rights, 
civil society, and media freedom. 
Attention will now turn to Soliq Info, 
BEM and Ereport, businesses founded 
by Komil Allamjonov, which began 
producing accountancy/tax goods  
and services at a time when he was a 
senior operative working for the  
State Tax Committee.
Postscript
The first draft of this report was 
completed and submitted to  
Komil Allamjonov for comment on 
24 September 2019, at Allamjonov’s 
request. Since the first draft was 
provided to Allamjonov he has 
concluded his role at the Agency for 
Information and Mass Communications, 
in order to take up the Public Fund for 
Support and Development of National 
Mass Media Chairmanship. Company 
extracts were re-checked on 26 April 
2020 to verify any changes in share 
ownership arrangements, see Table 3 
where the changes are highlighted.
Table 2: Komil Allamjonov’s public and civic positions 2005-202019
Komil Allamjonov’s Public and Civic Positions
Head of Press Service, State Tax Committee 2005-2009
Head of the Information Service, State Tax Committee 2009-2013
Press Secretary, President of Uzbekistan 1/12/2017-
3/10/2018
Acting Director General, Agency for Press and Information 28/11/2018-
2/2/2019




Chairman, Board of Trustees, Public Fund for Support and 
Development of National Media.
Current
19 ‘Komil Allamjonov’, Public Foundation for Support and Development of National Mass Media, available online, https://www.massmedia.uz/en/pages/management 
(accessed 30 July 2020)
20 Agency of Information and Mass Communications under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘Provisions of the Agency of Information 
and Mass Communications under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan’, no date, available online:  https://aoka.uz/en/agency/
provisions (accessed 17 July 2020)
21 ‘Alexandra Kolesnichenko appointed Director of the Public Fund for Support and Development of National Mass Media’, Kun.uz, 14 July 2020, available online: https://
kun.uz/en/news/2020/07/14/former-tennis-player-chairs-public-fund-for-support-and-development-of-national-mass-media (accessed 17 July 2020)
22 ‘Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva to head Uzbek media fund’s board of trustees’, Fergana News, 2 February 2020, available online: https://en.fergana.news/
news/114721/ (accessed 26 April 2020)
23 ‘Komil Allamjonov clarifies financing sources of the new Fund’, Kun.uz, 3 February 2020, available online: https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/02/03/komil-allamjonov-
clarifies-financing-sources-of-the-new-fund (accessed 26 April 2020)
Further relevant details can be 
observed in Diagram 1. For example, 
Avtotest Report, Ereport Services, 
and Pomidor Entertainment share a 
registered telephone number, while 
Pomidor Entertainment and Ereport 
Services also share a registered street 
address, indicating again they may be 
part of a unified business structure. 
Turning to Table 2, which lists Komil 
Allamjonov’s public and civic positions 
since 2005, it is apparent that there is 
an overlap between his public roles and 
business life. Several key businesses, 
for example, were established and 
developed while he served in a senior 
public capacity at the State Tax 
Committee.
Table 3: Companies which Komil Allamjonov claims to have founded, company extract checked on 16 August 
2019 and 26 April 2020. 


















Soliq Info Centre 5 August 2008 X Sultanova X Sultanova n/a






BEM Systems 26 November 
2009
Soliq Info Centre; Soliq 
Info Tahririyati



















24 Exhibit A to Registration Statement, Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 13 March 2020, available online: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6799-
Exhibit-AB-20200313-1.pdf (accessed 12 July 2020)
The first two businesses Komil Allamjonov acknowledges 
founding is Soliq Info, a tax specialist newspaper, and 
BEM Systems, a producer of automated accountancy 
software. The legal entities used for these projects 
were incorporated in 200825 and 200926 respectively. 
Allamjonov was the State Tax Committee’s Head of Press 
Service and then of Information Service during this period. 
Both businesses appear to have obtained competitive 
advantages from the privileged access and marketing 
support they enjoyed from Allamjonov’s public employer, 
the State Tax Committee. 
At an arguably more benign level, 
the State Tax Committee co-convened 
seminars in partnership with Soliq Info, 
where invited participants would enjoy 
direct access to senior tax officials. 
At these seminars, BEM products and 
Soliq Info were directly marketed 
to participants.  
The impact of these sales pitches on 
the audience needs to be put in context. 
At the time, the State Tax Committee 
was one of the most powerful organs 
in the Karimov regime’s authoritarian 
apparatus. Reports suggest business 
people and accountants alike suffered 
at the hands of tax inspectors who used 
their authority to extort bribes, and 
other benefits.27 Senior state officials 
also leveraged real or contrived tax 
violations, to execute expropriation 
and extortion rackets.28 This occurred 
with near impunity. Additionally, State 
Tax Committee members are alleged 
to have personally banked a part of the 
tax dividend owed to the state 
(and Uzbek public).29 
There is no evidence Komil Allamjonov 
personally participated in these corrupt 
practices. Nevertheless, as the State 
Tax Committee’s press spokesperson 
he should have been acutely aware of 
the committee’s public reputation. 
Set against this political backdrop, it 
would appear reasonable to conclude 
that any recommendation at an event 
hosted by the State Tax Committee 




     STATE AID 25 Soliq Info Centre, Company Extract, Reg No 2775-09, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 12 February 2019.26 BEM Systems, Company Extract, Reg No 3763-09, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services , accessed 12 February 2019.27 ‘Uzbekistan: Officials admit to graft problem in talks with entrepreneurs’, Eurasianet, 31 October 2016, available online: https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-officials-admit-graft-problem-talks-entrepreneurs (accessed 4 September 2019); Ezhkov, S. ‘About persons, taxes and arithmetic operations’, UzMetronom, 31 October 2016, available online: www.uzmetronom.com/2016/10/31/o_personakh_nalogakh_i_arifmeticheskikh_dejjstvijakh.html (accessed 4 September 2019); Iskandar, S. 
‘GNK and the legalisation of provocations’, UzMetronom, 28 January 2013, available online: www.uzmetronom.com/2013/01/28/gnk_i_legalizacija_provokacijj.html 
(accessed 4 September 2019)
28 Memorandum and order, Interspan Distribution Corp., v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc, US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, 
Civil Action No. H-07-1078, 21 August 2009; Patrucic, M. 'How the President's daughter controlled the telecom industry', Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting 
Project, available online: https://www.occrp.org/en/corruptistan/uzbekistan/gulnarakarimova/presidents-daughter-controlled-telecom-industry (accessed 
4 September 2019); Roz Trading Ltd., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, Republic of Uzbekistan, Oziqovqatsanoat and Zeromax Group, Inc. in the International 
Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, 6 June 2006.
29 ‘Usman Khaknazarov: Turkish truth for Rustam Azimov’, Ozodagen, 14 March 2017: available online: https://catoday.org/centrasia/usman-haknazarov-tureckaya-
pravda-dlya-rustama-azimova (accessed 4 September 2019)
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30 ‘Uzbek Tax Committee holds seminar on e-reporting’, Uz Daily, 17 December 2013, available online: https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/25956 (accessed 16 August 2019)
31 Nigmatova, O. ‘Uz Taxes: Calculate Correctly, Report Correctly’, no date, available online: www.enews.uz/index.php?newsid=36446 (accessed 16 August 2019)
The use of ostensibly impartial 
government taxation organs, to market 
products and services being sold 
privately by companies founded by a 
senior tax committee official, would 
appear an improper use of public power. 
It cannot be inferred that Allamjonov, or 
corporate management at BEM or Soliq 
Info are responsible for this improper 
application of public power. However, 
the companies did appear to receive 
notable benefits as a result, which were 
arguably anti-competitive in nature. 
Amplifying the concerns this raises are 
allegations that tax officials coerced 
customers into buying Soliq Info and 
BEM products. 
For example, on 9 May 2013 an industry 
professional wrote on the Forum of 
Accountants and Businessman of 
Uzbekistan bulletin board: ‘Good day! 
We have a state of emergency, yesterday 
the taxman brought and left a contract 
and an invoice from LLC “SOLIQ INFO 
SYSTEMS” for the delivery of the 
electronic newspaper Soliq Info, along 
with the program for sending electronic 
reporting. All this is at 249,000 soums, 
and [he] said to sign and pay’.32
Colleagues responded to this post 
with their own stories of coercion. 
One accountant wrote: ‘Today I was 
in the State Tax Inspectorate (STI) of 
the Chilanzar region for the balance 
recalculation. Of course, as others, 
I was asked if we bought the Soliq Info’s 
electronic version with a disk. Of course, 
I said that we already have it, although 
we don’t need it. But the tax inspector 
obviously didn’t believe it. Half an hour 
after returning from the STI, they  
(the STI) are calling and saying that we 
reportedly have an overdue receivable, 
although we don’t and they ask us 
to come to the STI, as they say,  
“with things”’.33
In order to verify these allegations a 
local journalist in Uzbekistan reached 
out to accountants and industry 
professions during 2019 who verified 
these claims, two were prepared to 
participate in formal interviews  
(even anonymous interviews relating 
to the business interests of senior 
regime figures, is seen as high risk by 
participants). One accountant with 
over 15 years experience claims: ‘The 
tax office told us to buy BEM and we 
could not refuse. The tax inspector 
reminded us to buy it a thousand 
times … most accountants are used to 
working with the 1C program. Most are 
now working with 1C. They were forced  
to buy BEM, even if they did not use 
it… BEM was distributed exclusively 
by tax inspectors. I do not know a 
single accountant who would buy BEM 
because they wanted to’.
Similar pressure was applied with 
respect to Soliq Info: ‘The tax office 
forced [us] to subscribe to the 
newspaper during inspections. It is true 
that the necessary information was 
published in it, but if it weren’t forced, 
not everyone could purchase an annual 
subscription because of its high cost’.
Another experienced entrepreneur 
and tax expert confirms: ‘The tax 
committee forced [us] to buy an annual 
subscription to the newspaper  
[Soliq Info] and buy programs [BEM] …  
They forced [us] to buy BEM especially 
in 2010-2011. Forced subscription to 
the newspaper “Soliq-Info” began 
even earlier’. They continue: ‘The tax 
committee made me buy BEM and also 
subscribe to Soliq Info … Well, we did 
what they say, otherwise, you know 
how it works, they won’t let us work’.
It cannot be inferred that Komil 
Allamjonov or business executives at 
Soliq Info or BEM were aware that tax 
inspectors had been systematically 
harassing and coercing professionals 
into buying company products. Clearly 
though it prompts important questions: 
Who ordered this campaign of state 
coercion? What was their motivation? 
And, who knew about the operation?  
Turning now to, Ereport Service, there 
is documentary evidence that it was 
state policy to provide this business, 
founded by Allamjonov, with dedicated 
support and marketing services. 
Ereport is a programme and digital 
platform which allowed industry 
professionals working in taxation and 
accountancy, to submit tax documents 
online, and receive dedicated support 
and feedback from public officials on 
the ‘intricacies of applying legislation in 
the course of doing business’, alongside 
a number of other digital services.34 
The company behind the programme 
is Ereport Service LLC. It shares a 
telephone number and street address 
with Avtotest Report and Pomidor 
Entertainment (Pomidor was recently 
renamed Milliy Telekanal). The former 
business will be scrutinized in the 
next section. 
32 Forum of Accountants and Businessmen of Uzbekistan, “Forced subscription to electr. newspaper ....”, 9 May 2013, available online: fmc.uz/forum/viewtopic.
php?t=8297 (accessed 16 August 2019)
33 Forum of Accountants and Businessmen of Uzbekistan, “Forced subscription to electr. newspaper ....”, 9 May 2013, available online: fmc.uz/forum/viewtopic.
php?t=8297 (accessed 16 August 2019)
34 ‘EReport - A package of services for a modern accountant’, Infocom.uz, 1 October 2014, available online: infocom.uz/2014/10/01/ereport-kompleks-uslug-dlya-
sovremennogo-buxgaltera/ (accessed 14 August 2019)
WHO IS 
WEAK 
PAYS!In a similar tone, E-News Uz reports: ‘On September 24, 2013, the State Tax Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, together with the editorial office of the newspaper Soliq Info, held a seminar on the topic: “Current issues on personal income tax, single social 
payment and insurance contributions 
of citizens”’. It goes on to state: 
'Particular attention is paid to the 
automation of accountants’ labour.  
For these purposes, several years ago, 
the BEM program (Accounting electron 
madad) was developed, which made 
it possible to significantly reduce the 
financial and time costs of accountants 
and make tax calculations in full 
compliance with national standards. 
A new version of the program was 
presented at the seminar, taking into 
account changes in the legislation 
regarding the calculation of personal 
income tax, single social payment and 
other types of deductions'.31
There were some compelling reasons 
to purchase a Soliq Info newspaper 
subscription. It was designated in law 
the official publication for key financial 
announcements on bankruptcy. 
The paper’s editorial team also 
enjoyed, rightly or wrongly, excellent 
access to senior tax and finance 
officials. However, for many industry 
professionals they could acquire the 
modest inputs of information they 
needed from freely available sources 
such as Norma and Lex, without the 
added expense of a subscription. 
Views on BEM were more mixed. 
Reviews online and offline, complained 
it was buggy, and unreliable. Some 
accountants stated they preferred 
the rival 1C program. 
Numerous news reports can be found online from the 2011-2013 period, which 
describe how BEM and Soliq Info were marketed at these events convened with 
the State Tax Committee. Uz Daily observes that the ‘State Tax Committee of 
Uzbekistan, in cooperation with Soliq Info newspaper, held a seminar for heads 
and accountants of enterprises and organizations, “Automatization of Accounting 
and Electronic Reporting”, on 17 December 2013’. It continues: ‘At the event, 
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According to minutes taken at the 
Republican Commission for the 
Coordination of the Implementation 
of the Comprehensive Development 
Program of the National Information 
and Communication System of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan for 2013-2020,  
‘Ereport Service Limited Liability 
Company has developed the domestic 
Ereport software (hereinafter - the 
Ereport software), which allows 
consulting services to be provided to 
business entities in real time on issues 
of presenting financial, tax, statistical 
and other types of reporting, taxation 
and accounting’.35 This was based on 
information supplied by the Deputy 
Chairman of the State Tax Committee, 
Mr O Rustamov.
The Commission formally agreed to a 
proposal ‘of the State Tax Committee, 
the State Customs Committee, the 
State Statistics Committee, the State 
Committee for Communications, 
Informatization and Telecommunication 
Technologies and the State Commercial 
People’s Bank of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan to introduce Ereport 
software throughout the country on 
a voluntary basis’. 
The meeting minutes record that 
the State Tax Committee, the State 
Committee for Statistics, and the State 
Commercial Bank of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, agreed that within two 
months they would ‘develop the rules 
of interaction and take the necessary 
measures to integrate their information 
systems for receiving electronic 
reports with the Ereport software’. 
They also agreed to work ‘on an 
ongoing basis, together with interested 
ministries and departments to conduct 
wide explanatory work among all 
business entities and to assist Ereport 
Service LLC in concluding contracts  
for the purchase of Ereport software’. 
The minutes, in effect, log a series 
of decisions, which indicate that 
government agencies agreed to 
calibrate their digital systems to the 
Ereport platform technology, giving 
EReport Services LLC what would 
appear a significant competitive edge 
over any potential rivals. In addition, 
the state also agreed to help market 
the Ereport software and secure 
contracts with customers. A copy of the 
standard contract accessed through 
an archived version of the Ereport 
website indicates that customers paid 
300,000 soum for 12 months access 
to the platform. There is no mention 
of any other company getting similar 
assistance in the meeting minutes. It is 
also questionable whether a contract 
can be characterised as ‘voluntary’ 
where direct sales support is involved 
from the Karimov government, given 
the evidenced track record of tax officials.
Like with the BEM software, Ereport 
also benefited from regular seminars 
and workshops convened with the 
State Tax Committee and the Ministry 
of Finance where the software was 
demonstrated and promoted.36 Ereport 
Service’s own website records a regular 
menu of co-convened events during 
2015 and 2016. By this stage Allamjonov 
had left his post at the State Tax 
Committee (see Table 2).
35 Meeting Minutes, Republican Commission for the Coordination of the Implementation of the Comprehensive Development Program of the National Information 




A freedom of information request was 
lodged with the State Tax Committee 
on 21 August 2019, in the required 
legal format as set out in the law, 
On the Openness of the Activities of 
Public Authorities and Administration.37 
The request asked for a copy of the 
proposal cited in the minutes taken 
at the Republican Commission for the 
Coordination of the Implementation 
of the Comprehensive Development 
Program of the National Information 
and Communication System of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan for 2013-2020. 
It was not responded to within the 
stipulated period of 15 working days. 
A complaint was lodged with the 
President’s Office on 1 October 2019. 
Following the complaint, a response 
was received from the State Tax 
Committee on 6 December 2019.38 It 
states that the proposal referenced 
in the request had been destroyed 
under Article 24 of the law On Archival 
Matters.39 Article 24 of the law states 
that records must be stored for 15 years. 
Given that the requested proposal 
was made in, or around, 2014 it would 
appear that the record may have been 
improperly destroyed in violation of the 
law On Archival Matters. As a result of 
the governmental failure to retain or 
provide records, as required under the 
aforementioned laws, it was impossible 
to further examine the rationale behind 
the notable state aid agreed to by 
the Republican Commission for the 
Coordination of the Implementation 
of the Comprehensive Development 
Program of the National Information 
and Communication System of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan for 2013-2020.
A common feature of the Soliq Info, 
BEM, and Ereport cases – three 
companies founded by Allamjonov –  
is that they received dedicated 
marketing and sales support from a 
number of government agencies, but 
principally the State Tax Committee. 
Most seriously, there is evidence which 
indicates tax inspectors coerced tax 
and accounting professionals into 
buying Soliq Info and BEM products. 
However, there is no evidence currently 
available which proves either business, 
or their founder, ordered the latter 
activity, or were aware of it. 
These different forms of state support 
appear to have given the companies a 
potentially unfair competitive advantage, 
and helped generate revenue streams 
that benefited the businesses founded 
by Allamjonov. For a significant 
period spanning from 2005 until 2013, 
Allamjonov acted in a number of senior 
roles at the State Tax Committee. In 
light of the benefits these companies 
received, it reasonably gives rise to the 
impression of favour being given by 
a powerful state organ to the private 
interests of a senior official. 
The broad business model traced in 
this section, marked as it is by notable 
forms of state aid, would be observed 
again in arguably a new and heightened 
form, with the nationwide launch of 
Avtotest driver training software and 
education centres. 
37 On the Openness of the Activities of Public Authorities and Administration, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.ZRU-369, 5 May 2014, available online: lex.uz/
docs/2381138 (accessed 8 October 2019)
38 Letter from the State Taxation Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, to Professor Kristian Lasslett, Ulster University, 27 November 2019, 04-33967.
39 On Archival Matters, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, No.ZRU-252, 15 June 2010, available online: https://www.lex.uz/docs/1645544 (accessed 12 December 2019)
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Launched in 2012, Avtotest bills itself as immersive and 
interactive driver training software, that allows driver 
education to occur in a practical and realistic manner. 
The company, Avtotest Report, was founded by Komil 
Allamjonov.40 Its shares were held by Bobir Alimbabayev 
when the state register was originally checked on 16 
August 2019, an individual who also legally held the 
shares in Pomidor Entertainment. A subsequent check 
of the register on 26 April 2020 records that the shares 
in Pomidor Entertainment (renamed Milliy Telekanal) 
had been transferred to Komil Allamjonov. By this stage 
Allamjonov had stepped down from his post as head of 
the government’s media regulator. Alimbabayev remained 
the sole legal shareholder of Avtotest Report when the 
register was checked on 26 April 2020. There is a Facebook 
page for an individual by the name of Bobur Alimbabayev, 
who claims to be an employee of Soliq Info.41  
 
Authorship over a significant number of patented 
technologies registered by Avtotest Report, are attributed 
to Komil Allamjonov.42 Patent filings submitted on 16 of 
May 2017, listed Allamjonov as the General Director of 
Avtotest Report.43
Following a period of program 
testing, Avtotest received a 
significant commercial boost in 
the form of a decree signed off by 
the then Prime Minister, Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev in 2015. Article 2 of the 
decree states:
'In order to further improve the 
educational process and introduce 
modern training methods in the 
system of training and retraining 
drivers of motor vehicles and urban 
electric vehicles in the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, the Cabinet of Ministers 
decides … to agree with the 
proposals of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan: 
on the provision by Avtotest Report 
LLC and organizations in whose 
authorized capital of not less than 
51 percent of the shares (shares) 
are owned by Avtotest Report LLC, 
the right to carry out activities in 
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the 
training and retraining of drivers of 
motor vehicles and urban electric 
vehicles'.44
40 ‘Uzbekistan forever: How to create a business without a start-up investment?’, Forbes, 20 June 2014, available online: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:wM2L_y9s5zcJ:https://news.rambler.ru/world/25635230
41 See https://www.facebook.com/people/Бобур-Алимбабаев/100008248812294
42 See patents number 02649, 02806, 02857, 04488, 05253, 05228, 05236, 05237, 05229, and 05543, available from the Intellectual Property Agency register: http://
baza.ima.uz/ 
43 See patent number 04488.
44 On Measures to Improve the Educational Process and Introduce Modern Training Methods in the Training and Retraining System for Drivers of Motor Vehicles and 
Urban Electric Vehicles in the Republic of Uzbekistan, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Decree, No.106, 30 April 2015, available online: www.lex.uz/
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45 On Further Improvements to the Training and Retraining System, as Well as Advanced Training of Drivers Through the Introduction of Innovative 
Training Methods, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Decree, No.693, 4 September 2017, available online: http://www.lex.uz/ru/
docs/3332573?ONDATE=11.09.2017%2000#3332718 (accessed 5 September 2019)
46 Anti-Monopoly Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘Improving the qualifications of drivers: Clarification of the Antimonopoly Committee’, 7 August 2019, 








For readers of the Power Brief series 
the language of the decree will be 
familiar. It grants a significant economic 
privilege to a private entity on the 
basis of a proposal initiated by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, rather than 
an open and transparent process in 
which all market actors have access 
to on fair and equal terms. A freedom 
of information submission was made 
on 21 August 2019 to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, requesting a copy 
of the proposal. No response was 
received. A complaint was submitted to 
the Office of the President on 1 October 
2019, regarding the Ministry’s failure 
to meet the requirements of the law on 
the openness of government activities. 
No response was received.
Article 3 of the 2015 decree relating 
to Avtotest states: ‘The Council 
of Ministers of the Republic of 
Karakalpakstan and the regional 
khokimiyats, upon request by Avtotest 
Report LLC, within a month to ensure 
the provision of free land in areas 
adjacent to regional centres with an 
area of  at least 3 hectares for the 
construction of educational complexes’. 
The decree does not state whether 
Avtotest will be expected to pay annual 
rent for the land or any other access fee.
Then in September 2017 Avtotest was 
controversially granted a guaranteed 
market and monopoly, after a decree 
was passed – signed off by the current 
Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov – which 
forced legal entities with a car to 
undergo driving training every two 
years, using an Avtotest Education 
Complex. The Cabinet of Ministers 
decree again enacts a ‘proposal of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the 
establishment from 1 January 2018 
the procedure under which those who 
govern motor vehicles owned by legal 
entities (hereinafter — drivers) are 
required to undergo refresher training 
once in two years’.45 The decree also 
amends Article 2 of the 2015 decree 
cited above, so that it awards Avtotest 
the ‘exclusive right to carry out in the 
Republic of Uzbekistan activities  
to improve the skills of persons 
(drivers) who drive vehicles owned  
by legal entities’.
However, this formal attempt by the 
state to create a guaranteed monopoly 
market for one business, founded 
and led by Komil Allamjonov who was 
shortly after made Press Secretary to 
the President in December 2017, just 
before Avtotest’s market monopoly 
was to come into force, created 
sufficient public outcry that there was 
a rare backdown by government. The 
September 2017 decree was revised.  
In new provisions driver education  
and training licenses are opened up  
to the market, so any firm who can 
meet a certain standard can apply, 
while Avtotest’s exclusive right to  
train drivers of legal entities has  
been revised. 
Nevertheless, in August 2019 the state 
anti-monopoly committee reported 
that no other company besides Avtotest 
and its subsidiaries had been issued 
a license to deliver advanced driver 
training to drivers of cars owned by 
legal entities.46 It would appear that 
despite the legal revisions, Avtotest 
continued in 2019 to operate as an 
effective monopoly in a particular 
market where certain consumers by 
law must avail of the service or face 
financial penalties.
24 Behind the Entrepreneurial Veil: State Aid and Elites in Uzbekistan
Behind the Entrepreneurial Veil: State Aid and Elites in Uzbekistan 2726 Behind the Entrepreneurial Veil: State Aid and Elites in Uzbekistan
On 6 March 2020 Radio Ozodlik published an exposé.47 
It revealed that a potentially controversial Cabinet of 
Ministers' resolution, had been omitted from the public 
facing national legal database lex.uz. The resolution 
awards, without tender, a major public project to the 
foreign owned company, GID Systems Tashkent LLC. 
Radio Ozodlik claims under the resolution GID Systems 
Tashkent is charged with responsibility for overseeing the 
conversion of paper cadastral passports, which contain 
technical and ownership information for real property,  
into plastic smartcards.
A copy of the resolution was obtained by 
the authors. The Cabinet of Ministers' 
decree is dated 19 February 2020, and 
is numbered 101. Cabinet of Ministers' 
resolutions 100 and 102, both passed 
on the same day are publicly available 
via the government legal database. As 
Radio Ozodlik reported, decree 101 is 
not listed on Lex.uz. 
The decree states that the ‘foreign 
company’ GID Systems Tashkent 
LLC has been granted the right to 
exclusively implement a cadastral 
passport conversion project, in return 
for an investment of US$20 million.48 
The decree declares that the foreign 
company will design and install the 
technology and associated equipment, 
train government employees in 
its usage, and help maintain the 
equipment. 
It then notes that ‘the State Committee 
for Land Resources, Geodesy, Cartography 
and State Cadastre of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan shall be allowed to conclude 
a contract (hereinafter referred to as 
a contract), as an exception, without 
conducting tenders, through direct 
negotiations with the investor [GID 
Systems Tashkent] for a period of 5 years’. 
47 ‘Investigation: Issuance of new cadastral passport to all real estate in Uzbekistan was given to a dubious company without tender’, Radio Ozodlik, 6 March 2020, 
available online: https://www.ozodlik.org/a/kadastr-pasporti-gid-systems-tashkent-abdulla-aripov/30472469.html (accessed 7 March 2020)
In return for delivering this new 
smartcard system for cadastral 
passports over the proposed contract’s 
five year period, the foreign investor, 
GID Systems Tashkent, will receive  
‘18% of the established value of public 
services for the preparation of cadastral 
work and registration of cadastral 
documents for real estate provided 
during the term of the contract’. It 
appears from the wording that GID 
Systems Tashkent will collect 18% 
of the fees charged to the public for 
registering their property through this 
new smartcard based cadastral system 
over the proposed five year period. 
If the foreign investor fails to 
recover their ‘expenses’ through this 
arrangement – no definition is provided 
of what may be considered acceptable 
‘expenses’ – the Cabinet of Ministers’ 
resolution confirms GID Systems 
Tashkent will have its expenses covered 
by the Fund of Land Relations and 
State Cadastre Development of the 
State Committee for Land Resources, 
Geodesy, Cartography and State 
Cadastre. In effect, this provision 
appears to guarantee that this is a 
zero investor risk investment for GID 
Systems Tashkent, which it has been 
awarded without tender. 
Therefore, in summary, on the basis of 
the provisions in this decree it would 
seem GID Systems Tashkent has been 
given, without tender, an 18% stake in 
a publicly provided service which real 
property owners must avail of by law, 
for a proposed period of five years. If 
this stake fails to cover the company’s 
expenses over this five year period,  
the state has promised to cover  
the shortfall. 
Identifying the ultimate shareholders 
of GID Systems Tashkent is currently 
impossible based off publicly accessible 
records. GID Systems Tashkent is owned 
by GID FZE, a company incorporated 
in the UAE’s Hamriyah free economic 
zone, where share registers are not 
available for public inspection. However, 
new information uncovered for this 
report indicates Komil Allamjonov is 
closely tied to the GID group.
This investigation revealed that the UAE 
company, GID FZE, has two fully owned 
subsidiaries in Uzbekistan, GID Systems 
Tashkent and GID Tashkent.49 Inspection 
of registered patents in Uzbekistan 
kept by the Intellectual Property 
Agency reveals that GID Tashkent was 
granted a patent for ‘GID Smart Card 
Tools’ in 2018.50 The patent application 
submitted by GID Tashkent declares 
that Komil Allamjonov is the author of 
this software based tool. 
Further registered corporate details 
tie GID into a network of companies 
Allamjonov claims to have founded. For 
example, GID Systems Tashkent and GID 
Tashkent share a registered telephone 
number with Ereport Service, Avtotest 
Report, and Pomidor Entertainment 
(Pomidor Entertainment is now known 
as Milliy Telekanal). This detail appears 
on their respective company extracts 
maintained on the government’s 
register for legal entities.51 A fax 
number supplied to Uzbekistan’s 
Intellectual Property Agency by GID 
Tashkent, is also listed online as the 
fax number for Avtotest Report and 
Ereport.52 Finally,  GID Tashkent,  
Milliy Telekanal and Ereport Service 
have a shared registered street address. 
48 On measures to organize the preparatory work of a new sample cadastral passport for real estate objects, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
Decree, No.101, 19 February 2020.
49 GID Systems Tashkent LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.719377, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 26 April 2020; GID Tashkent LLC,  Company 
Extract, Reg No.11808-04, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 26 April 2020.
50 See patent number 05376, available online via the Intellectual Property Agency register, baza.ima.uz
51 Ereport Service LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.18563, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 8 June 2019; Avtotest Report LLC, Company Extract, Reg 
No.005983-03, Unified Portal of Interactive Public Services, accessed 8 June 2019; Pomidor Entertainment LLC, Company Extract, Reg No.9191-04, Unified Portal of 
Interactive Public Services, accessed 8 June 2019.
52 See http://mg.uz/org/117195 and https://web.archive.org/web/20190121204152/http://ereport.uz/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D
0%B8/%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%BE-%D1%81%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D0%BD-
%D0%BF%D1%81-%E2%80%93-%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B7-%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%B3%D1%83.html
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The case study presented in this Power Brief, 
indicates that a number of businesses founded 
by Komil Allamjonov, benefited from dedicated 
sales and marketing support provided in most 
instances on an exclusive basis by powerful 
state organs including the State Tax Committee 
and the Ministry of Finance. This accelerated to 
the point where tax inspectors were coercing 
consumers into buying subscriptions to Soliq 
Info and BEM. However, it cannot be proven 
Allamjonov or company management were 
aware of the latter abuses. 
These details extracted from the 
patent register, and corporate 
register, indicate there are a number 
of direct ties between companies 
founded by Allamjonov, and GID 
Tashkent. In addition, the smartcard 
technology patent filed by GID 
Tashkent claims Allamjonov is the 
software author. GID Tashkent is a 
fully owned subsidiary of the UAE 
based GID FZE, which is also the 
owner of GID Systems Tashkent.  
GID Systems Tashkent was awarded 
responsibility for the cadastral 
passport conversion project using 
smartcard technology, in a Cabinet 
of Ministers' decree that was not 
published on the government’s 
online legal database. This project 
was awarded without tender, 
and gives the investor significant 
benefits, including indemnity against 
loss. In light of examples covered in 
the above report sections, this raises 
the question of whether a venture 
tied to Allamjonov has benefited 
from anti-competitive and opaque 
state practices. Allamjonov did not 
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In addition, Cabinet of Ministers' 
decrees, and decisions by the public 
administration, delivered to businesses 
founded by Allamjonov certain 
exclusive rights, including in the 
case of Avtotest a period where the 
law required that a certain group of 
consumers (legal entities with a car) 
select their service on an exclusive 
basis. New evidence from 2020 
indicates Allamjonov is also tied to the 
GID group, which has benefited from an 
exclusive arrangement, indemnifying 
the investor against risk, which was 
awarded by government without 
tender. Concerningly in the latter case, 
the Cabinet of Ministers' decree does 
not appear to have been published 
on lex.uz. 
These cases as a whole all point to 
examples of businesses obtaining 
competitive advantages over market 
rivals, through the selective provision 
of state aid.
There is also evidence that this 
selective provision of state aid was 
provided in scenarios where there were 
potential conflicts of interest at play. 
For example, businesses such as Soliq 
Info, BEM and Ereport, emerged and 
benefited from State Tax Committee 
support at a time when Allamjonov 
was a senior official representing the 
government tax body. Additionally, 
privileges provided to Avtotest, were 
awarded shortly before Allamjonov 
assumed the post of Press Secretary 
to the President, while the exclusive 
arrangement struck with the GID group, 
took place shortly after Allamjonov 
stepped down as Director of the 
Agency for Information and Mass 
Communications.
When attempts were made to access 
administrative documents pertaining to 
some of these arrangements, the State 
Tax Committee claims the records had 
been destroyed, while the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs did not respond. The 
former noted actions that appear to 
be in violation of the law On Archival 
Matters. Attempt to obtain comment 
from Komil Allamjonov were initially 
welcomed. Following submission of 
the draft report, Allamjonov has not 
responded to the authors, despite 
several follow up requests. 
The facts presented in this case 
study, echo a broader set of themes 
emerging from recent investigative 
inquiries conducted in Uzbekistan. 
Namely, commercially significant 
privileges are being awarded by 
the state to businesses founded by 
senior government figures, or closely 
linked businesspeople, under closed, 
opaque conditions. These practices 
threaten to reduce investor confidence, 
constrain market activity, block 
entrepreneurship, diminish economic 
growth, and frustrate the rights of 
workers and consumers. Concerningly, 
key beneficiaries of such practices 
have been businesses founded by 
Komil Allamjonov, a prominent national 
figure who has had significant influence 
on the current reform process in 
Uzbekistan, both through public and 
civic roles. 
These findings point to the ongoing 
need for greater public policy attention, 
and action, focused on reforming 
the public and corporate governance 
environment in Uzbekistan, in ways 
that guard against anti-competitive 
practices, conflicts of interest, and 
more generally, corruption.53 
53 OECD (2019) Anti-Corruption Reforms in Uzbekistan: 4th Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Plan, available online: https://www.oecd.org/
corruption/acn/OECD-ACN-Uzbekistan-4th-Round_Monitoring-Report-2019-ENG.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019)
KEY STEPS
Enacting tangible reforms that draw 
on international best practice offers 
Uzbekistan the opportunity to grow a 
frontier economy that is not only dynamic 
and secure, but well governed with a 
premium placed on fairness, competition, 
transparency and human rights. Key steps 
in this reform process include the following 
recommendations, which are premised 
on a broader principle of reducing the 
opportunity structure for improper practices, 
and increasing the risk of detection 
where improper practices do occur. 
I.  Remove the provision of state support or aid through opaque 
proposals formulated by government or private entities, or other 
similar closed mechanisms. State aid should be provided in a strategic 
and open manner, with a clear rationale and processes for its 
provision that does not give unfair advantage to any particular entity. 
II. Open up all goods and services contracts administrated by the state, 
and other cognate opportunities, to open and transparent competition.
III. Reform Uzbekistan's company law to strengthen corporate 
governance and the public reporting requirements for limited 
liability companies, ensuring public access to key filings related to 
shareholdings, beneficial owners, company officers, annual reports, 
balance sheets, and audit reports. 
IV. Commission a public online register of legal entities that includes 
current and historical filings relating to shareholders, senior 
company officers, annual reports, balance sheets and audit reports, 
complimented by public information on beneficial owners and 
persons with significant control. 
V. Publish all public tender documents in an open register fully 
available online, which is complete and accurate.
VI. Introduce rigorous procedures for managing conflicts of interest,  
and censuring officials who fail to conform with existing prohibitions 
on undeclared conflicts of interest.
VII.  Enforce freedom of information requirements, to ensure civil society 
is able to add an extra layer of independent accountability.
VIII.  Train government departments on the law relating to record retention, 
with regular audits to ensure compliance with legislated record 
retention requirements.
IX.   Employ enhanced due diligence to ensure all successful candidates 
for senior state positions conform with the anti-corruption 
and ethical values the government of Uzbekistan has now committed to.
X.  Establish a public register of financial interests, where all senior 
public officials and elected members of parliament, submit annually 
their private sector activity and interests. 
XI.  Ensure the independence, and resource base, of oversight 
institutions such as the anti-monopoly committee and the 
newly established anti-corruption agency.




UzInvestigations is a civic initiative administered 
by Ulster University in partnership with the Uzbek 
Forum for Human Rights. Drawing on data science, 
investigative methodologies, and digital analytics, 
UzInvestigations aims to publish resources and 
analysis that help to forensically scrutinise 
corporate and government power in Uzbekistan.  
Our aim is to promote transparency, good 
governance, human rights, and civic engagement.
www.uzinvestigations.org
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